Abstract. Considering wireless sensor networks for border surveillance, one of the major concerns is sensing coverage. Breach probability can be used as a measure to analyze the tradeoffs and to determine the required number of sensors to be deployed to obtain a certain security level. In this paper, the sensing coverage of surveillance wireless sensor networks is studied by utilizing a well-known image processing technique. By applying the watershed segmentation algorithm to the sensing coverage graph, the contour points, which are followed by the breach paths, are found. To determine the weakest breach path by utilizing the contour points, Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm is used. Under uniformly distributed random deployment, the breach probability is evaluated against the sensor model parameters, field width and the number of sensors deployed.
Introduction
One of the vital concerns of the surveillance application of WSNs is determining the sensing coverage and analyzing its effect on target detection [1] , [2] , [3] . A running energy-efficient SWSN application is presented in [4] . During the deployment phase of the WSN applications, considering the sensing coverage, the most effective parameters are the sensing and communication ranges of the sensors. Carle and Simplot-Ryl assume that the communication and sensing range of a sensor node are equal [5] . For a set of sensor nodes that provide at least one-degree of coverage on a convex region (if the least number of sensor nodes that cover a region is K, then the coverage is said to be of K degrees), the communication graph is connected if the communication range of the sensor nodes is greater than or equal to twice the sensing range [6] , [7] .
In this paper, we study the sensing coverage provided by the sensor nodes in terms of the detection probability. We propose two schemes to calculate the sensing coverage by utilizing the sensor detection model presented in [8] . After deploying the sensor nodes, assuming that the positions are known, the sensing coverage is determined. Considering the calculated sensing coverage probability surface as an image, we apply the watershed algorithm to determine the contours. The contour pixels, which correspond to the grid points, provide the weak breach paths. To find the weakest one, we apply Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm [9] .
In the next section, by revisiting the weakest breach path problem, we define the sensor detection and field models, and present how the watershed segmentation algorithm is used to find the breach paths in a SWSN. In Section 3, the scenarios used in the simulations, effects of the sensor detection model parameters on the breach probability, and the effect of number of sensors on breach probability are analyzed. The conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
The Weakest Breach Path Problem
The weakest breach path (WBP) problem is to determine the breach probability of the weakest path that a target traverses the region from the insecure side to the secure side [10] . As shown in Fig. 1 .a, we model the field as a two-dimensional grid. In this grid-based field model along the y-axis, we add boundary regions to the two sides of the field. The lack of boundary regions misleads breach path calculations since the breach path follows either the leftmost or rightmost line along the y-axis when the boundaries are not provided. In order to find the sensing coverage, we utilize the sensor detection model that is defined by Elfes [11] and Zou & Chakrabarty [8] . The probability that sensor k detects a target on grid point (i, j) is represented by
where r e (r e < r) is a measure of uncertainty in sensor detection, distance and a = d ijk − r + r e . With r, r e , λ and β, the sensor detection model can be adjusted according to the physical properties of the sensor. In particular, r and r e affect the threshold distances of target detection. When the sensor-totarget distance is smaller than r − r e , the target is absolutely detected. When the sensor-to-target distance is larger than r +r e , the target can not be detected. Sample sensor detection models are depicted in Fig. 1 .b. If it is assumed that the measurements of individual sensors are statistically independent, then the detection probability of a target on grid point (i, j) is
where R is the total number of sensors deployed in the region. Thus, equation (2) represents the so-called uncorrelated coverage model. When a decision whether a target exists is to be made, the individual decisions of a subset of sensors may be highly correlated. That is, if a sensor detects a target, it is highly probable that another sensor which is located in similar proximity as the first one will also detect the same target, assuming homogeneous environmental factors. Consequently, for the "correlated coverage model", the detection probability of a target on grid point (i, j) can be written as
The two probabilities P I and P D act as upper and lower bounds on the detection probability, respectively. The weakest breach path problem can now be defined as finding the permutation of a subset of grid points
with which a target traverses from the starting point s to the destination d with the least probability of being detected. The nodes (x j−1 , y j−1 ) and (x j , y j ), j = 0, 1, . . . , k, must be connected to each other, the starting node must be connected to (x 0 , y 0 ), and the grid point (x k , y k ) must be connected to the destination node. Here we can define the breach probability P B of the weakest breach path V as
where P x j y j is the detection probability associated with the grid point (x j , y j ) ∈ V , and P x j y j = P I x j y j for the uncorrelated coverage model and P x j y j = P D x j y j for the correlated coverage model. The detection probability associated with the starting and destination dummy nodes is zero since they are not monitored.
Using the two-dimensional field model and adding the detection probability as the third axis, we obtain hills and valleys of detection probabilities (see Fig.  2 .b). The weakest breach path problem can be informally defined as finding the path which follows the valleys and through which the target does not have to climb hills so much. Because, the valleys denote the lowest detection probabilities. Furthermore, regarding the two-dimensional field model as an image, where the detection probabilities of the grid points can be mapped to the gray levels of the pixels, suggests that image processing techniques can be employed.
One of the well-known image segmentation algorithms is the watershed algorithm [12] . The watershed algorithm is best-understood with an analogy to water flooding from the minimal points of a three dimensional topographic surface where the third dimension is the altitude. As the water increases, dams are built where the floods would merge. After the completion of immersion, only the dams emerge and separate the valleys. This algorithm can be easily applied to the coverage area of wireless sensor networks in order to find the possible breach paths. After deploying the sensors to the field and calculating the coverage area of the sensor network, utilizing the miss probabilities on the grid points produces hills and valleys where the altitude is mapped to the miss probability as shown in Fig. 2 .a. The minimal points of this surface is the sensor node positions. Thus, analogously, it can be considered that the water starts flooding from the sensor nodes. After applying the watershed algorithm, the contour points (dams) correspond to possible breach paths as shown in Fig. 2 .b.
Among these breach paths we still need to find the weakest one. For this reason, a graph is constructed using only the contour points and Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm is applied. A similar approach to the one explained in [10] is used. To identify the insecure side of the region the starting node is added which is connected to all of the points on the closest line of the grid on x-axis. Similarly, the secure side is identified with the destination node and all of the contour points of the farthest line of the grid are connected to the destination point. The aim of the target is to traverse the region from the starting node till the destination node by proceeding on the contour points where the detection probabilities are the smallest among all. The boundary regions are not taken into consideration while constructing this graph, because we want the breach path pass through the field, not through the boundaries. 
Analysis of the WBP Problem
The sensor detection model defined in the previous section reflects the infrared or ultrasound sensor characteristics [8] . In this work, we utilize an infrared sensor model where the sensor detection parameters are r = 20 m., r e = 18 m., λ = 0.3 and β = 0. 8 . In order to analyze the watershed algorithm to find the breach paths, we use two scenarios where the fields differ in dimension. These are the Embassy Perimeter Security (EPS) scenario where the sensors are deployed in the perimeter to detect unauthorized access, and the Country Border Surveillance (CBS) scenario where a portion of the country border is monitored by a wireless sensor network to detect possible terrorist infiltration across a segment of the border. For these two scenarios, the field parameters are shown in Table  1 . The grid size is taken to be 1 m. in the simulations. It is assumed that similar sensor types are used in both scenarios so that the sensor detection model parameters are taken to be the same. Upon analyzing the effect of β on the breach probability for the EPS scenario, it is seen that selecting a sensor with a larger value for β will increase the breach probability. Holding λ constant and increasing β decreases the detection probability (see Fig. 1.b) . Thus, the breach probability shown in Fig. 3 .a increases in β. The same conclusion can be drawn for λ on interpreting Fig. 3 .b and Fig. 1 .b. The increase in the breach probability is delayed in terms of parameter increase when the sensing coverage is calculated using Eq. 2. Furthermore, when compared to β, increasing λ causes a quicker rise in the breach probability.
In Fig. 4 , the required number of sensors for a breach probability less than 0.01 is shown for different sensor characteristic parameters λ and β. Extreme values of λ and β provide special detection models. For example, when λ = 1, β = 1 or λ = 0, β = 0 the sensor detection model turns out to act as a binary detection model, where the threshold value becomes r − r e and r + r e , respectively. Considering this, when Fig. 4 is analyzed, it can be concluded that the sensing range is very critical in determining the required number of sensors. Thus, while designing a SWSN, selection of sensors significantly affects the breach probability. The required number of sensors is 9 when λ = 0, β = 0. However, when λ and β are set to one, the requirement becomes 200. As λ and/or β increase, the breach probability grows exponentially. Holding the required number of sensors constant, when a large field in width is analyzed, larger breach probabilities are observed (see Fig. 5 ). Widening the field allows a target more space with smaller detection probabilities to traverse. When the EPS scenario is compared to the CBS scenario, the increase in breach probabilities for the two sensing coverage calculation schemes is larger in CBS. Similar trends are observed for the two sensing coverage calculations in EPS, whereas for the CBS, the two breach probability curves tend to converge to one. This is because, when the width is increased in the CBS scenario, the target is able to find a path which is distant enough from most of the sensor nodes such that the minimum distance between the sensors and the path is r+r e . Therefore, when the width is greater than r + r e , the breach probability increases more. To determine the required number of sensor nodes for a given breach probability level, it is crucial to analyze the effect of the number of sensors on the breach probability. Since a truncated sensor detection model is used, the breach probability remains at a constant level as long as the deployed number of sensors are not sufficient to cover the region fully. Thus, for the EPS scenario, on analyzing Fig. 6 .a, at about 15 to 40 sensors the breach probability is around 0.4. When 40 sensors are deployed to the field, the saturation or, in other words, full-coverage is achieved. Thus, at first a sharp decrease is observed when more than 40 sensors are deployed. Afterwards, the breach probability does not seem to be affected with additional sensor deployment. The reason behind the lack of further improvement is the value chosen for the field width. Since the field width is less in the EPS scenario compared to the CBS scenario, most of the time the path does not curl in the region and flow along the x-axis. However, in the CBS scenario when Fig. 6 .b is analyzed, considering that the same type of sensors are deployed (the detection probability is truncated to zero at a distance of r + r e = 38 m.), the width of the field is twice the width of the EPS scenario. In this scenario, the path may curl and flow along the x-axis depending on the fact that smaller detection probabilities may exist. Consequently, there exist more steps in the curve of the breach probabilities in Fig. 6 .b. More clearly, the additionally deployed sensor does not have an impact on the path, because the sensor-to-path distance is larger than r +r e . The steps of the curves are more straight for P D compared to P I . This is due to the fact that the additional sensor deployment has no effect on the detection probability of the target-on-the-path if it is not closer than the closest sensor when the sensing coverage is calculated with P D . However, when the sensing coverage is calculated with P I , if the dis-tance between the additionally deployed sensor and the path is less than r + r e , the deployment affects the detection probability of the target-on-the-path.
Conclusions
In this paper, we applied the watershed segmentation algorithm on the sensing coverage to find the weakest breach path in surveillance wireless sensor networks. The sensor detection model proposed by Elfes is utilized to calculate the sensing coverage. This model has two significant properties: the detection model is a truncated one and it acts as a binary detection model when λ = 1, β = 1 or λ = 0, β = 0. Utilizing two scenarios, namely the embassy perimeter security and country border surveillance scenarios, we analyzed the effects of detection model parameters, sensor requirement and field width. The breach probability increases in λ and/or β. With constant number of sensor nodes, the breach probability also increases if the field is widened, especially when the width is larger than r + r e . Furthermore, increasing the number of sensors does not affect the breach probability until a sensor is deployed close to the weakest path. As a future work, we are planning to analyze the breach probability for the threedimensional terrains.
